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Plotinus’ ethics has attracted considerable scholarly attention in recent years.1 
The debate revolves around the status of practical ethics. One view is that Plo-
tinus is much more interested in the metaphysical principles of reality than in 
man and the empirical world. If he has an ethics at all, it is the otherworldly, 
self-centered and elitist ethics of the late antique sage that does not have much to 
offer to ordinary people. Other scholars accord ethics, including other-regarding 
virtues, a more extensive role in Plotinus; they argue that social engagement has 
firm doctrinal basis in his metaphysics.2 In this essay, I shall try to elucidate Plo-
tinus’ ethics from a different angle. Given that both camps accept that the crucial 
question concerns the relation of ethics to metaphysics, I deem that issue worthy 
of closer scrutiny. There is only one short passage in the corpus where Plotinus 
explicitly discusses the relationship between the two disciplines. For this reason, 
I shall first examine the characteristics of Plotinus’ ethical thought using a par-
ticular example, the analysis of human freedom in the treatise On the Freedom 
and the Will of the One (VI 8). Then, at the end of my paper, I turn to the treatment 
of ethics in the treatise On Dialectic (I 3. 6). I shall argue for the following claims. 
1. Plotinus sets out his ethical teaching primarily in terms of metaphysics rather 
than directly, by means of analysis of ethical conduct. 2. He is committed to the 
ideal of a contemplative life. Nonetheless, his metaphysics provides reasons for 
the philosopher to engage in practical action as necessity arises, and to act for 
the sake of other persons. 3. There is such a thing as a Plotinian ethics but, given 
his notion of philosophical explanation and his concept of reason, it is not an 
autonomous discipline. 4. He has a largely coherent view of human action which 
explains how theoretical knowledge can be turned into action.
1  This study was written with the support of the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (K-75500). 
I am grateful to E. K. Emilsson for reading a draft of my paper, and to Chad Jorgenson for check-
ing my English.
2  For the first view see Wildberg (2002), Chiaradonna (2009), and Dillon (1996), the paper 
which started the debate. For the second interpretation see Smith (1999) and (2005), Schniewind 
(2003), Song (2009). O’Meara (2003) develops a comprehensive account of Neoplatonic ethics 
and political philosophy along these lines. Others seek to find a middle way, Remes (2006) and 
Stern-Gillet (2009). Beierwaltes (2002) emphasizes that the contemplative ascent, which is at the 
heart of Plotinus’ philosophy, implies ethical self-transformation, and he grants that it does not 
necessarily exclude moderate involvement in practical affairs.
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1 The criterion of autonomy and the activities  
     of human soul
In VI 8, Plotinus explores whether the notion of ‘being in one’s power’ (τὸ ἐπ’ 
αὐτοῖς) can be applied to the gods, and, above all, to God, the first principle. 
The notion in question evidently belongs to the sphere of human life.3 Plotinus 
wonders whether and, if so, how it can be transferred to the divine principles.4 
He first examines human autonomy (chs. 1–6),5 then he turns to the applicability 
of the notion to God, the One or the Good (chs. 7–21). The first part, which is pre-
paratory to the theological inquiry, can be regarded as an ethical treatise.
The question is couched in terms of ‘being in one’s power’ (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἐπ’ 
αὐτοῖς), but ‘freedom’ (τὸ ἐλεύθερον) is used synonymously with the former term 
in the treatise.6 In Hellenistic and Imperial times, ‘being in one’s power’ standardly 
refers to the autonomy requisite for moral responsibility which became a central 
issue in the debates about Stoic determinism. The Stoics discuss ἐλευθερία in the 
context of normative ethics, more precisely, in the delineation of the ideal of the 
wise person.7 In Epictetus’ ethics, freedom is a central value, the ideal state to 
be achieved through philosophy. He works out a method of spiritual exercises 
designed to transform one’s attitudes and value judgements in such a way as to 
completely detach oneself from what is external and to achieve internal freedom.8 
In VI 8, Plotinus seems to have this kind of ideal freedom in mind rather than the 
minimal autonomy required for responsibility.9
He advances the following account of the (common) notion of ‘being in one’s 
power’:
3  VI 8. 1. 2–3.
4  VI 8. 1. 18–21.
5  VI 8. 1. 13–15 (tr. Armstrong): ‘But we must pospone these questions for the present, and first 
enquire about ourselves, as we usually do, whether anything does happen to be in our power 
(ἐφ’ ἡμῖν).’
6  For instance, VI 8. 4. 6; 4. 10–11; 4. 35; 5. 33; 6. 6; 6. 26–27.
7  Diogenes Laertius, VII 121. Cf. ibid. VII 33; Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 5; Philo, Quod omnis 
probus 21ff. The ideal of freedom seems to have Socratic roots (Xenophon, Mem. IV. 5), and it is 
present in the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions (see next section).
8  See especially Diss. IV. 1. Cf. Dio Chrysostomus, Or. 80. 
9  Cf. Eliasson (2008) 206. For the broader context of Plotinus’ analysis of human and divine 
autonomy in Imperial philosophy see O’Meara (1992), Lavaud (2007) 176–179 and Frede (2011) 
125–130.
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I myself think that, when we are pushed around among opposing chances and compulsions 
and strong assaults of passions possessing our soul, we acknowledge all these things as our 
masters and are enslaved to them and carried wherever they take us, and so are in doubt 
whether we are not nothing and nothing is in our power, on the assumption that whatever 
we might do when not enslaved to chances or compulsions or strong passions, because 
we wished it (βουληθέντες) and with nothing opposing our volition, this would be in our 
power. But if this is so, our notion of ‘being in our power’ (ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) would be 
‘what is enslaved to our volition (βούλησει) and would come to pass (or not) to the extent to 
which we wished it’ (VI 8. 1. 22–33, tr. Armstrong, modified).
The fundamental oppositions in terms of which autonomy is defined are the con-
trast between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’, and that between oneself and other 
things.10 Not only chance circumstances and compulsions but also passions 
of the soul count as ‘external’, presumably on the grounds that they make the 
rational self depend on other things, while the ‘internal’ side is represented by 
rational volition (βούλησις). Later in the treatise it emerges that ‘volition’ does not 
necessarily presuppose a two-sided decision-making faculty: freedom does not 
require that the agent be able to do or not to do something.11 Positively, volition 
can be understood in terms of a conscious and knowledge-based desire for the 
good of the subject and, ultimately, for the transcendent Good. It is sufficient for 
autonomy that the agent pursues his own good rather than the good of another 
on the basis of knowledge of that good.12 The normative notion of rational auto-
nomy outlined in the preliminary definition—that is, freedom from error, passion 
and external influences—underlies both the account of human autonomy and the 
theological part of the treatise.
In an intricate aporetic argument, Plotinus surveys the faculties of human 
soul, relying more or less on Aristotle’s psychological model. Desiderative activi-
ties—both irrational desires and rational desires aiming to satisfy natural bodily 
wants—are excluded from the sphere of autonomy mainly because they are exter-
nally determined. As for cognitive operations, φαντασία fails for similar reasons. 
Sense-perception and (rational) cognition are discarded on the grounds that they 
10  Oneself versus other things: VI 8. 4. 11–22 and 31–32; 6. 32–34. Internal versus external: VI 
8. 4. 2–3; 4. 9–10; 4. 32–34; 6. 19–22 and 26–30; cf. 17. 25–27.
11  VI 8. 4. 4–7 and 11–22; cf. 21. 1–7. This contrasts not only with the decidedly indeterminist Al-
exander of Aphrodisias (De fato, 181. 6 Bruns), but also with Aristotle (NE 1113 b 7–8). The phrase 
‘comes to pass or not’ does not imply a two-sided decision-making faculty. Plotinus refers back 
to this part of the definition in the argument which aims to detach volition from practical action 
(VI 8. 5. 34–6. 3).
12  VI 8. 3. 2–5; 4. 12–15; 7. 1–3.
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are inert and do not grant control over what is being done.13 Reason, however, 
can operate not only as the instrument to achieve the goals set by desire, but also 
as an active, ruling principle.14 Plotinus tentatively suggests two ways in which 
the activity of reason thus understood may qualify as autonomous:
And if reason itself makes another desire, we must understand how; but if it puts a stop to 
the desire and stands still and this is where what is in our power is, this will not be in action, 
but will stand still in intellect; since everything in the sphere of action, even if reason is 
dominant, is mixed and cannot have being in our power in a pure state (VI 8. 2. 33–37, tr. 
Armstrong, modified).
These two forms of freedom—self-contained contemplative activity and the intrin-
sic desire of reason that is at work in virtuous action—are in fact included in the 
final theory. Plotinus concludes that the activity of intellect and the desires deri-
ving from intellection are truly free.15
Plotinus uses the same criterion to demarcate the sphere of autonomy as 
Epictetus does. He considers what it is that depends on the agent himself, as 
opposed to things depending on other factors. However, the Platonic reinterpre-
tation of this criterion leads to significant differences. First, Plotinus relies on 
a multipartite psychological model. Secondly, he grounds the possibility of exclu-
sive control over some of our mental operations metaphysically, that is, with the 
immateriality of soul and of intellect.16 Thirdly, while Epictetus focuses on the 
problem of preserving our autonomy in practical situations, in Plotinus the quest 
for freedom leads one away from the sphere of practical action, and it finds its 
goal in Platonically conceived contemplation.
13  VI 8. 2. 2–8: ἐπιθυμία, θυμός; 2. 8–25: λογισμὸς μετ’ ὀρέξεως; 2. 8 and 3. 8–17: φαντασία, 
αἴσθησις; 2. 25–30: γνῶσις. The discussion shows that human body is also discarded, cf. 
n. 16 below.
14  VI 8. 2. 31: ποιεῖ … καὶ κρατεῖ.
15  VI 8. 3. 22–24: τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν … καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νοεῖν ἐγειρομένας. Cf. 
6. 4–6: ‘we shall assert that virtue and intellect have the mastery and that we should refer being 
in our power and freedom to them’. 
16  VI 8. 6. 26–27 (tr. Armstrong): ‘So it is still clearer that the immaterial is the free, and it is to 
this that being in our power is to be referred.’ Immaterial entities enjoy self-determination on 
account of their causal properties: they are impassible and essentially active principles, cf. III 
1. 8. 4ff.
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2 Virtue in action and virtue as contemplative  
     activity
How are we to understand the claim that the autonomy of practical action is 
‘mixed’?17 Which aspects qualify as autonomous, and what kind of limitations 
does Plotinus have in mind? Since Plotinus is concerned with normative freedom 
rather than moral responsibility, only virtuous action is a viable candidate for 
(partial) autonomy.18 The question is to what extent virtuous actions are subject 
to the exclusive control of the agent himself. That is why the attainment of the goal 
(τεῦξις), which depends also on external circumstances, is ethically irrelevant. 
However, the agent is in charge of whether he acts in a noble way (καλῶς) and 
whether he does his best.19 The second qualification is that the exercise of virtue 
is provoked or indeed compelled by the situation.20
… if someone gave virtue itself the choice whether it would like in order to be active that 
there should be wars, that it might be brave, and that there should be injustice that it might 
define what is just and set things in order, and poverty, that it might display its liberality, or 
to say quiet because everything was well, it would choose to rest from its practical activities 
because nothing needed its curative action, as if a physician, for instance Hippocrates, were 
to wish that nobody needed his skill (VI 8. 5. 13–20, tr. Armstrong).
The virtuous person is no activist. Rather, he is like a physician curing a dis-
ease.21 He refrains from acting if possible, but under appropriate conditions—
that is, if circumstances are adverse enough—he seeks to restore the natural order 
of things. Virtue is ‘necessitated’ to the extent to which it is the external circum-
stances that require its intervention. While external action is heteronomous in 
this sense, the ‘volition which precedes action’ is exempt from necessity and is in 
our power.22 Thus, autonomy is confined to the internal, psychic side of action. 
According to a third qualification, a distinction is needed even within this realm: 
virtue as psychic disposition or state does not include the desires and passions to 
which it brings limits or from which it liberates the person.23
17  VI 8. 2. 36–37.
18  Cf. Plato, Resp. 617 e 3: ‘virtue is no man’s slave’, quoted at VI 8. 5. 30.
19  VI 8. 5. 3–7. Cf. Epictetus, Diss. II. 5. 6–8.
20  VI 8. 5. 12–13 and 20–21.
21  Cf. Stern-Gillet (2009) 340f. In principle, preventive actions (as distinct from curative ones) 
could also have a place here, but Plotinus’ examples suggest otherwise.
22  VI 8. 5. 22–27.
23  VI 8. 5. 27–34; 6. 22–26. In the treatise On Virtues the moderation of passions is a function 
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The conclusion is that the autonomous aspect of virtuous action can be 
located in volition (βούλησις). This inner core of virtuous action, of which the 
agent is fully in control, is described in intellectualistic terms: ‘also in practical 
actions self-determination and being in our power is not referred to practice and 
outward activity but to the inner activity of virtue itself, that is, its thought and 
contemplation’.24 This account cuts across the Aristotelian distinction between 
theory and practice. In Plotinus’ view, it is contemplative, noetic activity—νόησις, 
θεωρία—that is at the heart of virtuous practical actions. The contemplative activ-
ity in question is probably directed to some specific aspect of the intelligible world 
rather than to the second hypostasis in its entirety.25
The distinction between internal activity and external actions recalls the 
metaphysical model of double activity which is designed to explain causality.26 It 
is an important part of this theory that the internal activity constituting the sub-
stance of the cause brings about the external activity automatically, without any 
special effort, intention or attention on the agent’s part, provided that a suitable 
substrate is present. We may wonder if the internal contemplative activity which 
constitutes virtue produces practical actions in this way. On the one hand, the 
term ‘internal activity’ strongly suggest this. Further, elsewhere Plotinus argues 
that the world–soul and the astral souls exert their external ordering activity 
effortlessly and without deliberative calculation, while they remain engaged in 
contemplation of higher realities. The relationship of cosmic soul to the bodies 
they take care of provides the ideal model for embodied human soul.27 Ποίησις 
and πρᾶξις can equally be an accompaniment (παρακολούθημα) of contempla-
tion in the case of human agents, too, as long as their external performance is 
guided by an intelligible object of contemplation.28 On the other hand, the virtu-
of ‘civic virtue’ (I 2. 2. 13–26), while ‘purificatory virtue’ entirely detaches the soul from the body 
and bodily desires (5. 2ff.). Plotinus’ initial question at VI 8. 5. 27f. reminds us of the former, but 
in the discussion—to judge from the maximalist expectations set for virtue (VI 8. 6. 14–18)—he 
seems to have in mind mainly the latter. Likewise, virtue is introduced as a disposition or state 
of the soul (ἕξις, διάθεσις, 6. 27–28, 35), but finally it is classified as ἐνέργεια (6. 21–22). For lower 
virtue as disposition and higher virtue as activity see VI 3. 16. 27–31; VI 2. 18. 15–16.
24  VI 8. 6. 19–22, tr. Arsmtrong.
25  Cf. I 2. 7. 3–6; V 8. 10. 11–16.
26  Emilsson (2012) 355–357 suggests that the distinction between external and internal action in 
Plato’s Republic (443 c–d), which underlies VI 8. 6. 19–22, is interpreted by Plotinus in the light 
of his doctrine of double activity (or, perhaps, it is among the inspirations of that doctrine). 
27  IV 4. 8; IV 8. 2; II 9. 18. 30–35. See Smith (1999) 233–235.
28  III 8. 4. 39–44. Cf. Smith (1999) 233; O’Meara (2003) 133. Wilberding (2008) 375–378 suggests 
that only ποίησις can qualify as an accompaniment of contemplation, while πρᾶξις is always 
its weakening. However, Plotinus does not distinguish here between πρᾶξις and ποίησις (cf. 
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ous person reacts to external stimuli29 which implies that he or she takes notice 
of them. In fact, it is difficult to imagine that the virtuous person acts without 
paying attention to the circumstances or without availing herself of sense-per-
ception and discursive reason. But if she does make use of these faculties, it is not 
clear in what sense the model of double activity applies to her action. I shall come 
back to this difficulty in the final section of my paper.
For the time being, let me put Plotinus’ view on the partial autonomy of vir-
tuous action into its proper historical context. In an early, Platonically-minded, 
work Aristotle contrasted the social virtues on the one hand and the theoreti-
cal cognition of reality on the other. The social virtues that inform the practical 
life of man while in body qualify as ‘necessary’, whereas the life of theoretical 
cognition, which we will enjoy on the Isles of the Blessed and which is called 
free life already in earthly existence, is ‘the only thing we want’.30 This idea can 
be connected with Plato’s comparison of the liberty of the philosopher with the 
servitude of the person engaged in public life.31 The contrast between the liberty 
of contemplation and the qualified autonomy of practical action that requires the 
use of the body is wide-spread among the Platonists (and other philosophers) 
of the Imperial Period.32 We can see now that Plotinus’ claim that the primary 
form of autonomy consists in noetic understanding rather than practical action33 
reformulates a traditional doctrine. However, his account of virtuous action goes 
beyond the conventional statements of the primacy of contemplation in that it 
isolates a contemplative core within practical virtue itself. In his view, contempla-
tion and action are not independent alternatives; rather, virtuous action can be 
understood in terms of external manifestation of contemplation.
the usage at III 8. 3. 3–6); for action deriving from perfect contemplation see III 8. 6. 37–40. Cf. 
V 3. 7. 29–34.
29  VI 8. 5. 12–13; 6. 10–11.
30  Protr. Fr. 12. Ross = Augustinus, De trinit. XIV 9. 12 and Iamblichus, Protr. IX 52. 16–54. 
5 Pistelli.
31  Theaet. 172 c–176 c. For the freedom of disembodied philosophical souls cf. Phaedo 66 c–e, 
114 b–c.
32  Alcinous, Didasc. 2. 2–3. For other sources see Baltes/Dörrie (2002), Baustein 174. 1 with 
commentary.
33  VI 8. 6. 3–10 and 32–43; cf. IV 4. 44.
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3 Divine Intellect as model of human freedom
Plotinus develops his analysis of the freedom of purely contemplative activity at 
the end of the treatment of human autonomy.
But the contemplative, that is the primary, Intellect is what is in its own power in this way, 
that its work in no way depends on another, but it is all turned to itself and its work is itself 
and it rests in the Good, being without need and fulfilled, and, one might say, living accord-
ing to its volition; but its volition is its thinking, but was called volition, because it was to 
its mind (κατὰ νοῦν); for what is called volition imitates what is in Intellect (VI 8. 6. 34–38, 
tr. Armstrong, modified).
This account concerns divine Intellect rather than its human counterpart.34 Uni-
versal Intellect is relevant to Plotinus’ argument for two reasons. Plotinus asked 
whether the notion of autonomy can be applied to the ‘gods’ and the ‘primary 
things’ (VI 8. 1. 1–11); the second hypostasis, Intellect, that is being discussed 
here certainly falls within this category. What is more important for my purposes 
here is that the self-contained activity of Intellect is introduced as the paradigm 
of human autonomy (as can be seen from occurrence of the notion of ‘imitation’ 
at the end of the quote).
Let us have a closer look at this relationship. Plotinus emphasizes with 
respect to Intellect that 1) its operation is self-directed and it does not depend 
on anything else; 2) in this kind of operation it possesses the Good on its own 
level, that is, it has attained its goal, hence it is ‘fulfilled’ and ‘lives according to 
its volition’; 3) its volition is intellection. Plotinus compares the mode of opera-
tion of Intellect and the volition (βούλησις) in the human soul that, in context, 
can be understood as comprising both purely theoretical activities and the kind 
of contemplation that may find its expression in virtuous action.35 Plotinus stated 
that (1) volition remains or at least wants to remain by itself (ἐφ’ αὑτῆς), and it 
is capable of preserving its independence in the face of external challenges;36 (2) 
volition in the soul is ultimately directed to the Good: it wants it, and it attains it 
34  The phrase πρῶτος νοῦς regularly refers to universal Intellect rather than human reason 
(I 6. 9. 34; III 8. 8. 19; V 3. 5. 27 and 39; V 5. 1. 34; VI 7. 29. 27). Moreover, while Plotinus uses the ἐπί 
+ dative construction in the plural first person in connection with human autonomy (VI 8. 2. 34–
35; 3. 21; 6. 5–6), the phrase occurs here in the third person (ἐφ’ αὑτῷ, 6. 32; cf. 6. 44; 13. 11).
35  At VI 8. 6. 29–31 the first part of the sentence seems to refer to the volition that constitutes 
virtue, while the second part (ὃ αὐτὴ βούλεται …) can be interpreted in terms of the contempla-
tive activities of the soul.
36  VI 8. 6. 6–14 and 27–30.
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again and again (τυγχάνειν);37 (3) human volition, too, can be described in terms 
of intellectual cognition.38
The slogan ‘lives as he wishes to’ is the traditional description of the ethical 
ideal of freedom.39 Plotinus transfers this description to Intellect, and thus he 
creates continuity between autonomous human volition and the activity of divine 
Intellect. On the other hand, the nature of human freedom can only be fully under-
stood if we trace it back to its intelligible principle, if we grasp it as an image 
of the sovereignty of Intellect.40
However, human freedom is related to Intellect even more intimately than 
the image–model relationship suggests. Human intellect and universal Intellect 
are not two numerically distinct things. Plotinus postulates that human intellect 
is part of the organic unity of Intellect, and it is in some sense identical with the 
other parts and with the whole.41 As a consequence, man is capable of having 
immediate experience of the transcendent modes of freedom enjoyed by Intellect 
and by the One.42 Human contemplative activity, insofar as it attains its goal, is 
not merely an image of the activity of Intellect but coincides with it.43
The nature of human freedom is explained in metaphysical—rather than in 
genuinely ethical—terms. The most important part of the answer to the question 
concerning human autonomy is provided by the metaphysical doctrine of Intel-
lect.
37  VI 8. 6. 38–39 and 41–42; 7. 5.
38  Cf. VI 8. 5. 22–24 and 6. 27–28 with 5. 34–35; 6. 21–22. 
39  Epictetus, Diss. IV 1. 1; cf. IV 1. 128; II 1. 23–2. The description of freedom in these terms is 
traditional Stoic doctrine, see Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 34; De officiis I 69ff.; Persius, Sat. V; 
Philo, Quod omnis probus 59f., cf. 97; Dio Chrysostomus, Or. 14.17.
40  The text of VI 8. 6. 34–38, as printed in Henry/Schwyzer (1982) and translated by Armstrong, 
incorporates an emendation by Igal (ἡ γὰρ instead of καὶ γὰρ at 6. 37), but the aspect I am em-
phasizing here—the paradigmatic role of the activity of Intellect for human volition—does not 
depend on this conjecture.
41  V 3. 3. 21–29; IV 3. 5. 6–19; VI 2. 20; cf. Enn.V 9. 6. 3–5.
42  VI 8. 15. 14–22. I take it that the βούλησις discussed in the first chapters belongs to the psychic 
level, while the ‘nature’ that is in contact with Intellect and the One (15. 14) is on the level of the 
second hypostasis. In successful contemplative acts the soul manages to adapt the images in 
itself to the originals in Intellect, and thus it partakes in non-discursive, noetic understanding, 
cf. V 3. 4. 1–15; 6. 25–28.
43  A further question, which I cannot pursue here, is whether the analogy Plotinus draws 
between the ethical self-constitution of man and the self-causation of the Good (VI 8. 13. 12–
47) implies a different understanding of autonomy. This possibility is explored by Remes 
(forthcoming).
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4 The intertwinement of metaphysics and ethics
In the Timaeus, Plato posits an intelligible paradigm in order to explain certain 
properties of the physical world. In Plotinus, this mode of explanation is exten-
sively applied to the interrelations of entities that are ordered by the principle 
of metaphysical priority. The image may provide a starting-point for the inquirer 
in the cognitive process that leads to the intellectual grasp of the original,44 but 
the latter enjoys explanatory priority. The image can be known only if it is iden-
tified as an image of its model, whereas the model cannot be explained in terms 
of its images. The methodology based on the notions of original and image is 
a variety of Plotinus’ ‘vertical’ explanations. In his view, the phenomena of the 
empirical world can be understood if we trace them back to their intelligible prin-
ciples.
Ethical values are explained in the same way. In VI 8, it emerges that autono-
mous human volition, which is at the root of contemplative life and may also be 
operative in practical action, is an image of the self-contained activity of Intellect, 
and, perhaps, it partially coincides with it. This kind of justification of ethical 
doctrines can be detected in other contexts, too. Virtue,45 happiness46 and self-
knowledge47 are likewise traced back to their models in Intellect.
This methodology has important consequences both for Plotinus’ ethics and 
his metaphysics. We have seen that the inquiry into human freedom in VI 8 is 
conducted on a very abstract level. Plotinus barely takes into consideration prac-
tical situations. All we can gather concerning ethical conduct is that the virtuous 
person acts only if circumstances render it absolutely necessary, and that he is 
prepared to sacrifice his own life, his children and his fatherland if the end he 
has in view so dictates.48 Instead of an analysis of ethical life, we get a metaphysi-
cal account of human nature interspersed with references to Intellect that is por-
trayed as the model of human autonomy. I believe, however, that Plotinus’ ethical 
44  III 7. 1. 20–24.
45  The ideas of the virtues are in Intellect (V 8. 10. 11–16; VI 2. 18. 15–16; VI 6. 16. 16–18). At 
I 2. 7. 3–6, the noetic archetypes of the cardinal virtues are identified with various aspects of the 
self-directed cognitive act of Intellect.
46  I 4. 4; cf. I 5. 7. 
47  Plotinus draws a parallel between the self-knowledge of Intellect and human ethical self-
knowledge (VI 7. 41. 17–22). Self-knowledge is connected with the knowledge of God both on the 
level of soul and that of Intellect (V 3. 4. 20–24; 6. 3–4; 7. 7–8). In the former case, self-knowledge 
has a spiritual-ethical dimension, cf. V 1. 1. 1–22. The origin of this motif is Plato’s analysis of ethi-
cal self-knowledge, see Alc. I 133 c.
48  VI 8. 5. 7–20; 6. 14–18.
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thought is not confined to texts which explicitly address questions of human good 
and of social relations, but much of it is implicitly contained in metaphysical 
doctrines. When he comes to speak about the perfect, self-sufficient, eternal life 
of Intellect, he clarifies, at the same time, what the essence of human freedom, 
virtue and happiness consists in. Ethics is, as it were, telescoped into metaphys-
ics.
Let me explain. The metaphysical model of reality is pregnant with normative 
implications. 1) The metaphysically prior grades of reality enjoy priority in value 
as well. The ontological and causal order represents an axiological order. Thus, 
the metaphysical framework determines the direction of life praxis and it sets 
the goal for man. The human good consists in a life lived on the level of Intellect 
which is ultimately directed to the Good, the only absolute reference point in the 
system. 2) The analysis of human nature is also relevant to ethical praxis. The 
distinction between the lower, bodily self and the higher, intellectual self implies 
the injunction to direct our awareness to the latter and to allow ourselves to be 
guided by this aspect of our nature. 3) Plotinus seems to work out his metaphysi-
cal doctrines with ethical considerations in view.
The last point can be illustrated with the passage discussed in the previous 
section. Plotinus’ Intellect is not exclusively an epistemological construct. Ploti-
nus’ theory contains notions—such as ‘turning toward oneself’,49 ‘desire for the 
good’50 and ‘care of oneself’51—which traditionally serve to describe the psycho-
logical and moral life of man. These notions are put into an ontological and episte-
mological context, and they are reinterpreted in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine 
of self-thinking Intellect. The inward turn of Intellect is its cognitive orientation, 
desire is the indefiniteness of the subject before it receives content, Intellect’s 
work on itself is its self-directed cognitive activity. At the same time, the theory 
of Intellect retains an ethical potential. Intellect sets the standard not only for 
perfect cognition; its self-sufficient, cognitively rich life that is centered around 
the Good can also be understood as the ethical ideal of contemplative life ele-
vated to the level of divine perfection.52 The enthusiastic, rhetorical descriptions 
of Intellect exhort the reader to imitate the divine paradigm.53 In addition, Intel-
49  Epictetus uses this notion in the context of ethical self-examination and self-perfection, Diss. 
I 4. 18f.; III 16. 15; Ench. 41. 1; Diss. III 22. 38f.; III 23. 16; Ench. 10. 1; Diss. IV 4. 7. Cf. III 12. 5.
50  Plato, Charm. 167 e; Gorg. 468 b–d, Meno 77 e-78 a; Aristotle, DA 432b5–7, 433 a 23ff., NE 1111 
b 19ff., 1113 a 15ff.
51  Alcib. I 132 b–c.
52  Aristotle also connects human and divine theoretical life, NE 1177 a 13–17; 1177 b 26–1178 a 2; 
Metaph. 1072 b 14–24.
53  See, for instance, VI 8. 15; V 8. 3–4.
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lect fulfills the role of explanatory principle in relation to the ethical life of man. It 
is the second feature of the theory that is exploited at VI 8. 6. 32ff. where Plotinus 
finds the model of human autonomy in the self-thinking act of Intellect.54
5 Consequences for other-regarding attitudes
If the intertwinement of ethics with metaphysics is sufficiently taken into account, 
the contested points concerning the status of practical ethics appear in a new 
light. I focus on the problem of self-centeredness. If the world of ethical praxis 
remains in the background, it is not, as though Plotinus’ philosophy entailed 
fleeing from the world, egocentrism and neglect of fellow men. Rather, he seems 
to suppose that the nature of human community can be best explained in terms 
of its principles in the intelligible realm.
Interpersonal relations and other-regarding attitudes are accounted for in the 
context of metaphysical doctrines concerning the soul and the unity of the intel-
ligible world rather than directly, by means of an ethical analysis of the human 
world. Embodiment implies that the soul turns away from the organic unity of the 
intelligible realm and it becomes isolated from it. The fact that its attention is 
focused on the needs, pains and pleasures, fears and desires of a particular body 
prevents it from contemplation of the higher realm.55 Man is merely a part of the 
sensible world and is subject to the causal nexus of nature, as far as his lower, 
bodily nature is concerned.56 The embodied human soul, however, potentially 
contains the whole of the intelligible realm.57 The ascent to the intelligible world 
involves actually becoming a ‘whole’, reintegration into the living unity of the 
intelligible world to which the higher self has always belonged. In this unity, the 
higher self retains some kind of individuality but, at the same time, it is not sep-
arated from other entities—among them other selves—by which the intelligible 
world is populated; it can even be regarded as identical with them and with the 
whole.58 In the light of these doctrines, the inward turn, ascent and contemplation 
54  The notions that figure here in the account of the ‘primary, theoretical Intellect’, are used 
elsewhere in descriptions of the ethical ideal of the contemplative wise person. Concern with the 
self as opposed to external things: IV 4. 44. 1–4; I 4. 4. 18–19. Inward turn: I 4. 11. 7–8 and 16–17. 
Living according to one’s volition: I 4. 5. 8–9; cf. I 4. 6. 13ff.
55  For the isolation of the soul see IV 7. 13. 11–12; IV 8. 4. 10–21; V 1. 1. 1–22; VI 4. 16. 21–26.
56  II 3. 9. 27–30.
57  I 2. 2. 3–5; II 3. 7. 11 and 22–23; III 4. 3. 21–27.
58  VI 5. 7. esp. 7–9 (tr. Armstrong): ‘For, since the others, and not only ourselves, are those [the 
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cannot simply mean secession from the human community. Quite the opposite, it 
is precisely in this way that we regain true community with our fellow men.59
The doctrine of the community of human souls or intellects in the unity of the 
intelligible realm provides motivation to appreciate other persons in earthly life. 
Other persons share with us the same intellectual nature, and they enjoy the 
same kind of community with God that we ourselves do.60 The wise person looks 
at the world form a detached, holistic perspective,61 without paying heed to the 
needs of the particular body his soul cares for. Plotinus depreciates our natural 
attachment to our relatives,62 but he does not do so in the name of a selfish ideal. 
He is ‘not unfriendly’ or ‘unsympathetic’, but ‘the best of friends’; he keeps his 
distance from the earthly fates of others no more than he does from his own.63 He 
values other persons (and himself) as citizens of the community of the intelligible 
realm rather than in their capacity as bodily, empirical beings.
Ordinary people who do not look beyond the world of action act in order to 
create external expressions of the cognitive contents dimly present in their souls 
which they can see more clearly in this form.64 By contrast, the wise person’s 
action does not serve the purpose of epistemic clarification because he is already 
capable of contemplating the intelligible objects within himself with sufficient 
clarity. His action is independent from any self-regarding interest. He displays 
‘what comes from himself’ (τὸ παρ’ αὑτοῦ), which, I take it, includes his actions, 
to another person (πρὸς ἄλλον ἀποφαίνει).65 In this sense, he acts for the sake 
of others. The awareness of the community of the souls I have discussed in the 
previous paragraphs may provide him with reasons to do so.
intelligible things], we are all (pantes) those. So then, being together with all things [persons?], 
we are those: so then, we are all and one.’ For the unity of the intelligible world and for relation 
between the parts and the whole see IV 8. 3. 6–21; V 8. 4. 5–9 and 22–27; VI 4. 14. 1–22. See also IV 
3. 18. 18–24 for the intimate community of disembodied souls.
59  Cf. Bussanich (1990) 172–180.
60  I 6. 5. 9–17; II 9. 9. 26–29; 9. 43–51; 9. 74–79; 16. 5–9.
61  Remes (2006) 17ff. calls attention to this aspect.
62  I 4. 7. 32–47; 8. 12–30; IV 4. 44. 6–9; VI 8. 6. 15–18.
63  I 4. 15. 21–25.
64  III 8. 6. 1–9; cf. 4. 31–36.
65  III 8. 6. 37–40; cf. 4. 41–44. Schniewind (2003) 182–184 interprets the external performance 
of the wise person described at 8. 37f. primarily in terms of his educational role.
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6 Practical reason and the division of philosophy
What has been said thus far suggests that ethics is almost dissolved in metaphy-
sics. However, weighty arguments can be adduced to the opposite effect. In the 
treatise On Dialectic Plotinus says that philosophy includes, along with dialectic 
(metaphysics), ethics and physics as well, which means that he expressly ack-
nowledges the existence of ethics as a discipline.66 Moreover, one might argue on 
the basis of the distinction between theoretical and practical reason made at least 
in two passages67 that ethics qualifies as an autonomous discipline in a deeper 
sense, too, since it is rooted in the natural structure of reason. Let us have a look 
at Plotinus’ conception of practical rationality with a focus on φρόνησις.
It is useful at this point to recall the basic traits of Aristotle’s notion 
of φρόνησις, practical wisdom. He divides reason into a scientific and a calcula-
tive part.68 The former is concerned with necessary, universal truths; its highest 
excellence is theoretical wisdom (σοφία) which includes insight into the princi-
ples and demonstrative knowledge of derivative theorems (νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη).69 Cal-
culative reason is related to contingent particular things; its characteristic mode 
of operation is deliberation (βούλευσις). Φρόνησις is one of the virtues of calcula-
tive reason (it is distinguished from productive expertises). Practical wisdom is 
related to the agent himself, it has to cope with particular situations, and it uses 
its deliberative powers to achieve the noble ends set by ethical virtue.70
Plotinus distinguishes between φρόνησις and σοφία in the following way:
And, in the same way, philosophy theorizes about the morals drawing on intelligible reality, 
but adds the virtuous dispositions and the exercises which produce them. The rational dis-
positions receive their principles from There, and they possess them as their own already; 
for in fact they are with matter for the most part. And the other virtues apply reasoning 
(λογισμούς) to the experiences and actions proper to them, but φρόνησις is a kind of supe-
rior reasoning (ἐπιλογισμός) and is concerned with what is more universal, and with ques-
tions of mutual implication, and <it controls> whether to refrain from action, now or later, 
or whether an entirely different course would be better. Dialectic and σοφία provide every-
thing for φρόνησις to use, in an even more universal and immaterial form (I 3. 6. 5–12, my 
translation, based on Armstrong’s).
66  I 3. 6. 1–7.
67  I 3. 6. 10–14; V 3. 6. 35–44.
68  NE 1139 a 5–15.
69  NE 1139 b 19–35; 1140 b 31–1141 a 19.
70  NE 1140 a 24-b 30; 1141 a 28-b 23.
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Φρόνησις is interpreted here in terms of practical intelligence and is distinguis-
hed from theoretical wisdom. The former is concerned, to judge from the opera-
tions ascribed to it, with particular practical situations, and it is characterized 
as a kind of reasoning (ἐπιλογισμός). The subordination of practical wisdom to 
theoretical wisdom is not alien to Aristotle either. It seems, then, that Plotinus 
has a notion of practical wisdom which largely corresponds to Aristotle’s.
However, the main bulk of evidence tells against this interpretation. 1) In 
several passages, φρόνησις is not distinguished from theoretical wisdom; rather, 
it is itself a contemplative activity of soul that unfolds the contents of Intellect.71 
This probably also implies that it is not concerned with particulars. 2) Its mode 
of operation is not discursive. Strictly speaking, φρόνησις and deliberative rea-
soning are incompatible since the person engaged in deliberation only searches 
what the φρόνιμος already possesses.72 3) Φρόνησις exerts an ordering activity 
both on the cosmic level73 and in human life. As a ‘purificatory’ virtue, it is the 
independent activity of soul that separates it from the body and brings it back to 
Intellect.74 On the whole, φρόνησις can be understood in terms of intelligence 
that is contemplative and creative at the same time, and thus it mediates between 
the intelligible and the sensible realm. Plotinus’ φρόνησις, at least in its standard 
use, is not practical intelligence as opposed to theoretical wisdom.
Moreover, non-Aristotelian features surface in I 3, too. First, φρόνησις is not 
limited to practical intelligence in this treatise either, but it has theoretical aspects 
as well.75 Secondly, φρόνησις, even if it exerts its activity in particular situation, 
is not concerned with particulars as such; rather, its object is ‘something more 
universal’. Presumably, it judges the particular situations in the light of univer-
sal values which it receives from the contemplation of intelligible reality. Thirdly, 
and most importantly, φρόνησις depends on theoretical wisdom for its content, 
71  I 2. 6. 12–13: ‘Σοφία and φρόνησις consists in the contemplation of that which Intellect con-
tains’. Cf. I 2. 3. 21–31; 7. 6–7; I 3. 5. 5–8. Φρόνησις is not distinguished from productive rationality 
either. Cf. V 9. 11. 13–16; II 3. 18. 7–8. 
72  IV 4. 12. 3–13.
73  I 2. 1. 16–19; II 9. 5. 1–8; IV 2. 2. 42–49; IV 4. 10–14. The external activity of φρόνησις, at least 
on the cosmic level, does not imply conscious attention and concern with the details. Cf. IV 
4. 11. 23–28; IV 8. 2. 26–30; IV 4. 8.
74  I 2. 3. 15; I 6. 6. 12–13; II 9. 15. 38–39; IV 7. 10. 7–19. Cf. Plato, Theaet. 176 a–b; Phaedo 69 a–c.
75  At I 3. 5. 5–8, Plotinus develops a distinction between φρόνησις and σοφία that differs from 
the one in the quote above: the former is a disposition of the soul directed to Being, while the 
latter concerns the first principle beyond Being. I take it that by σοφία human reason seeks to 
comprehend the Good (without being able to grasp it in its simplicity), whereas φρόνησις is 
a contemplative activity directed to the second hypostasis.
16   László Bene
as ‘σοφία provides to it everything for use’.76 I conclude that for Plotinus σοφία 
and φρόνησις are not excellences of two kinds of reason that differ both in their 
objects and their respective mode of operation; rather, they are subsequent stages 
in a descending series that conveys the contents of Intellect to human beings.
 The whole argument of the chapter aims to show that physics and ethics 
essentially depend on dialectic.77 This sits well with the paramount importance 
of Intellect in the explanation of ethical values I have discussed above. Of course, 
Plotinus does not mean to abolish the ethical sphere any more than he does the 
physical world. The empirical world has a firm metaphysical status as a charac-
teristic stage in the process of the unfolding of reality. Nevertheless, in the expla-
nation of ethical values he avails himself of a strictly metaphysical method.
7 The practical syllogism in Plotinus’ theory  
     of action
One may wonder precisely how the intelligible principles prompted by φρόνησις 
guide virtuous action. Plotinus’ remarks concerning the practical use of reason 
seem to point in opposite directions. 1) In VI 8. 5–6, the immaterial volition 
(βούλησις) and the internal activity, intellection or contemplation that constitutes 
virtue, which are alternative descriptions of the autonomous aspect of virtuous 
action, do not seem to be directed to the external world or to have a discursive 
mode of operation. Similarly, φρόνησις, in what I called its standard interpre-
tation in the previous section, is directed to Intellect rather than outward, and 
it is capable of exerting its ordering activity without deliberative calculation. 2) 
On the other hand, Plotinus states that practical intellect (νοῦς πρακτικός), as 
distinct from theoretical intellect, turns outward and it knows external objects 
rather than itself.78 Furthermore, in I 3. 6, φρόνησις has to do with particular situ-
ations and is characterized by some kind of reasoning. It is not clear, then, which 
place is assigned to the knowledge of external circumstances and to deliberative 
reasoning in Plotinus’ theory of action, and, in particular, in his account of vir-
76  I 3. 6. 12–14, cf. 5–6.
77  I 3. 6. 2ff.
78  V 3. 6. 36–39 (tr. Armstrong): ‘as the practical intellect looks to the outside and does not stay 
with itself, it could have a kind of knowledge of the things outside, but if it was altogether practi-
cal, there would be no necessity in it of knowing itself’. 
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tuous action. This is the question I left open in the discussion of the applicability 
of the model of double activity to virtuous action.
The difficulty can be resolved, I submit, if we suppose that Plotinus conceives 
of human action in terms of the Aristotelian model of the practical syllogism.79 
Practical reason is directed outward to the extent to which the minor premise 
of a practical syllogism contains information concerning the relevant external cir-
cumstances of action. This holds for virtuous and ordinary agents alike. However, 
the latter consider some external thing as the end of their action, too. That is why 
in their case also the major premise is externally determined, as it is furnished 
by irrational desires which are directed to external objects. Actions motivated by 
familial affection, by carnal desires, by spirit, by fear and by the desire for self-
preservation are analysed in these terms:80 ‘the premises of passion are the prin-
ciple [of action] and they belong to the irrational part’.81 This statement contains 
the characteristic term ‘premise’ (προτάσις) which makes sense in this context 
only if it refers to the major premise of practical syllogism.82
The wise and virtuous person is distinguished by the fact that the end he has 
in view is not external. Rather, he possesses his own good within, since in the 
contemplative activity in which he is engaged the subject and the object of cogni-
tion coincide.83 I take it that the contemplation which constitutes the inner core 
of virtue according to VI 8. 6 and φρόνησις in I 3. 5–6 belong to this type. This 
kind of contemplative activity may supply the major premise of action under 
certain circumstances. The syllogistic terminology is used by Plotinus in rela-
tion to virtuous action, too: ‘(we shall grant) that the premises [of action] derived 
from this [from the activity of intellect] (τὰς ἐντεῦθεν προτάσεις ) are truly free, 
and that the desires roused by thinking are not involuntary’.84 I take it that the 
‘desires’ mentioned here can be connected with the volition directed to noble 
79  NE 1146 b 35–1147 a 31; De motu an. 701 a 7–25. Aristotle uses this model to explain human 
action as well as animal behaviour. The major, more general, premise of practical syllogism for-
mulates a rule or a goal set by a desire, while the minor premise, which concerns the particular 
circumstances of action, is provided by a cognitive faculty; the conclusion is action itself.
80  IV 4. 44. 6–16.
81  IV 4. 44. 5–6, my translation. In Greek: ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου αἱ τοῦ πάθους προτάσεις. My 
interpretation of this difficult phrase is based on the note of Henry/Schwyzer (1982) ad locum 
who construe both ἀρχή and τοῦ ἀλόγου as predicates.
82  The Liddell/Scott/Jones dictionary lists among the meanings of προτάσις ‘stretching out, 
urge’. However, the only evidence adduced is the Plotinus passage I am discussing. In this case, 
therefore, I trust more Sleeman/Pollet (1980) s.v. προτάσις who are not familiar with this mean-
ing and render the word with ‘proposition’, ‘premise’.
83  IV 4. 44. 1–5 and 34–36.
84  VI 8. 3. 22–24, tr. Armstrong.
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ends that is operative in virtuous practical actions, while the ‘premises’ are the 
major premises of the practical syllogism that correspond to such desires. If that 
is so, Plotinus makes ethical praxis dependent on contemplation in a very spe-
cific sense. Contemplative activity does not only generally inform the external life 
of the wise person,85 but it also furnishes the ends that he pursues when engaged 
in particular actions.
As for discursivity, it cannot be excluded from the mental processes of the 
virtuous person which lead to action. Even if the contemplative activity that sup-
plies the major premise of the practical syllogism concerns universal values and 
is non-discursive in character, the agent must take into account the particular cir-
cumstances of action which provide the minor premise of the practical syllogism. 
There is not much evidence of the latter aspect in the texts,86 but it is required 
not only by common sense but also by the model of practical syllogism which is, 
or so I would argue, clearly at work in Plotinus’ analysis of virtuous action. The 
discursive operation preparing virtuous action is presumably not aporetic. This 
is suggested by the fact that Plotinus uses the language of command rather than 
that of deliberation in this connection.87
In some passages, Plotinus seems to depreciate practical action as such. For 
instance, he says that practical action is ‘under enchantment’.88 I believe, however, 
that a distinction needs to be made here. This statement holds strictly only for 
ordinary agents who do not have a higher end in view beyond the images of nobil-
ity brought about by action itself.89 By contrast, the action of the wise person is 
‘free from enchantment’, that is, it qualifies as autonomous, provided that he is 
guided by the contemplation of true nobility (as opposed to its images) and that 
85  Cf. I 2. 5. 21–31. For the relationship between noetic contemplation and theoretical life see 
Linguiti (2012) 185–190.
86  See, however, VI 8. 1. 39–44 where Plotinus insists against Aristotle (NE 1110 b 30–33) that 
voluntary action (ἑκούσιον) requires not only knowledge of the particular circumstances but also 
that of general principles. This implies that knowledge of particulars is needed as well. ‘Volun-
tary’ is a term for normative autonomy in VI 8. 
87  VI 8. 6. 16, 28: κελεύουσαν, ἐπιτάξειε.—The notion of ἐπιλογισμός at I 3. 6. 10 is perhaps in-
troduced to set apart φρόνησις from ordinary calculative thought. One might guess that this kind 
of thinking involves seeing the particulars related to action in the light of intelligible principles. 
Cf. Schniewind (2008) 210f. The interpretation of φρόνησις in I 3. 6 is atypical insofar as it seems 
to be responsible not only for the general knowledge contained in the major premise of practical 
syllogism but also for the whole mental process leading to action.
88  IV 4. 43. 18–24.
89  IV 4. 44. 25–33; cf. III 8. 4. 41.
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he regards action as ‘necessary’ rather than ‘good’.90 The evaluation of practical 
action depends on its goal, on the metaphysical orientation expressed in it.
In the theory of double activity, the internal activity necessarily brings about 
the external activity if a suitable substrate is present. The ‘necessity’ of virtuous 
action does not only connote heteronomy; it also implies that the virtuous agent 
cannot fail to act if action is called for by the circumstances. Thus, the language 
of ‘necessity’ conveys the notion of moral duty as well. The necessary, ‘automatic’ 
character of the action of the virtuous person resembles the external activities in 
the theory of double activity. However, this does not mean that he does not use 
discursive reason; the analysis of virtuous action in terms of practical syllogism 
suggests the opposite.
Plotinus’ conception of ethics is deeply Platonic. He is reluctant to separate 
praxis from theoretical cognition and he considers metaphysical theory as directly 
relevant to the ethical life of man.91 Plotinian φρόνησις cannot be understood in 
terms of practical intelligence as distinct from theoretical reason. Nonetheless, 
it has an ethical function as well which mainly consists in the mediation of the 
contents of Intellect to human soul. The way in which the principles conveyed to 
the soul by φρόνησις become operative in practical action can be elucidated in 
terms of the Aristotelian model of practical syllogism. Thus, Plotinus propounds 
a Platonic theory of action which accommodates elements of Aristotle’s theory. 
Later Neoplatonists go beyond him in this respect, but they seem to preserve his 
central insight, that is, the relevance of metaphysics to ethics.92
90  IV 4. 44. 18–21 and 25ff. Cf. VI 8. 6. 17–18.
91  Plato argues that the knowledge of the Forms, especially that of the Good, is indispensable 
for political leadership (Resp. 484 b–d; 504 d–505 b). Aristotle objects that the universal Good, if 
there were such a thing, would be irrelevant to the human good that can be achieved by means 
of practical action (NE 1096 b 31–1097 a 13). In an early work, however, Aristotle sets out a Pla-
tonic position: θεωρητικὴ φρόνησις, knowledge of ‘nature’ and of ‘the divine’ provides the phi-
losopher with a model on which he can rely in ethical and political action (Protr. Fr. 13 Walzer/
Ross = Iamblichus, Protr. 10).
92  For the reception of φρόνησις and of practical syllogism in Iamblichus and in other later 
Neoplatonists see O’Meara (2003) 90 and 136–138.
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